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THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE:
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE
INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED?
ALLISON B. JONES
INTRODUCTION
The principle behind the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 seems simple
enough: of all the federal courts, only the United States Supreme
Court has appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.2 Yet from
this innocuous principle rooted in our country’s federalist
foundations, a seemingly impermeable cover of jurisprudential kudzu
has grown. A primary source of the doctrine’s expansion and the
consequent confusion has been the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry
introduced by District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.3
Supreme Court opacity concerning what it means to be inextricably
intertwined4 has resulted in significant incongruity in the lower
5
federal courts, which is all the more troubling in light of the

Copyright © 2006 by Allison B. Jones.
1. The doctrine is named for the two cases that created it: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923), discussed infra at Part I.A, and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), discussed infra at Part I.B.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) (conferring on the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction
over final judgments of the highest courts of the states); cf., e.g., id. § 1331 (giving federal district
courts original jurisdiction over federal question suits); id. § 1332 (giving federal district courts
original jurisdiction over diversity suits).
3. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483–84 n.16 (1983).
4. See Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“Since Feldman, the Supreme Court has provided us with little guidance in determining which
claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a prior state court judgment and which are not.”);
Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993) (“There is, unfortunately, no bright line that
separates a federal claim that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment from a
claim that is not so intertwined.”); Razatos v. Colo. Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1433 (10th
Cir. 1984) (“[T]his [inextricably intertwined] language by itself does not provide district courts
with a bright line rule . . . .”).
5. See infra Part III.
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frequency with which these courts employ the concept, often to deny
6
federal jurisdiction.
Attention recently returned to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine via
the Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
7
Corp. Observing that lower courts had greatly expanded the
doctrine, the Court scaled back Rooker-Feldman and explicitly
clarified many aspects of the doctrine that had troubled federal
courts, except for what it means to be inextricably intertwined.8 This
Note first presents an account of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its
9
recent clarification; it then explores the different approaches taken to
interpreting the “inextricably intertwined” concept;10 and lastly it
speculates about what Exxon Mobil might mean for the future of the
11
“inextricably intertwined” inquiry.
I. THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
At its most basic, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after the
12
two cases from which it sprung, is the principle that lower federal
courts do not have jurisdiction to review state court judgments.13 It is
based on the congressional grant, in 28 U.S.C. § 1257,14 of appellate
6. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1999) (observing the “notable frequency” with which federal
courts invoke Rooker-Feldman to find that they lack jurisdiction).
7. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Parts I–II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), discussed infra at Part I.A; D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), discussed infra at Part I.B.
13. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005) (“Rooker
and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in which [the Supreme] Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over state-court judgments precludes a United States district court from exercising
subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate . . . .”
(internal citation omitted)).
14. The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) provides:
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or
where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where
any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority
exercised under, the United States.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “highest court of a State” includes the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
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jurisdiction over state court judgments to the United States Supreme
Court and the grant of original jurisdiction over certain suits to
15
United States district courts. Read together, these statutes indicate
that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court
16
judgments is exclusive and the jurisdiction of the federal district
17
courts is purely original. In addition to these statutory bases,
18
prudential considerations such as judicial federalism and system
19
consistency also underlie the doctrine. Because these limits are
statutory and prudential rather than constitutional, Congress can and
has made exceptions to the doctrine, most notably in granting district
courts jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petitions of state
prisoners.20
Although the Supreme Court has never found a case to be
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine aside from the two for which
it is named,21 lower federal courts regularly employ an expansive
version of the doctrine to dismiss federal actions.22 Understanding the

Id.
15. E.g., id. § 1330 (suits against foreign states); id. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction);
id. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction).
16. As a jurisdictional bar, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may be raised at any time, by
either party or sua sponte by the court. Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996). Like
other limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, it cannot be waived. 18
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][b], at 133-26 (3d ed.
2006).
17. See Benjamin Smith, Case Note, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis
of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’s Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 627,
629 (1987) (calling the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “the product of two negative inferences”).
18. See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1085, 1089–1108 (1999) (describing RookerFeldman as one of the doctrines created to address the “aggregation of issues arising from the
existence of two sets of American courts”).
19. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res
Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1350 (1980) (“[I]f trial courts could
readily annul the judgment of each other on the merits, the prerequisite of finality in the judicial
system would be destroyed. This is the system-consistency basis of Rooker.”).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) gives district courts jurisdiction over state prisoner habeas
petitions. Although exceptions are rare, other statutory exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine include bankruptcy jurisdiction and 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2000), which concerns
jurisdiction to invalidate the results of custody proceedings regarding an Indian child. See Doe v.
Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting these exceptions to the doctrine).
21. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005)
(remarking that the Court has applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only twice: first in Rooker
and then sixty years later in Feldman).
22. See Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1999) (“The doctrine has emerged as perhaps the primary
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cases that initially gave rise to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
essential to recognizing its intended scope.
A. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.
23
The plaintiffs in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. asked that the
federal court declare null and void the judgment of an Indiana circuit
court, which had been affirmed by the state’s supreme court; they also
sought “to obtain other relief dependent on that outcome.”24 The
Rookers were unhappy with the state court decision in favor of
Fidelity, and they believed that errors in the state court’s judgment
were to blame. After the judgment, they filed suit in federal district
court, claiming that the state court decision violated the Contracts
Clause, due process, and equal protection in that it gave effect to a
supposedly unconstitutional state statute and did not give effect to a
prior decision by the Indiana Supreme Court, which was alleged to
have become “the law of the case.”25
The district court dismissed the case, finding it not to be within
its jurisdiction as defined by Congress, and the United States
26
Supreme Court agreed. After first noting that the state court
properly had jurisdiction over the case and that the plaintiffs had a
full hearing there, the Court concluded:

If the constitutional questions stated in the bill [the federal suit]
actually arose in the cause [the state suit], it was the province and
duty of the state courts to decide them; and their decision, whether
right or wrong, was an exercise of jurisdiction. If the decision was
wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open
to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate
27
proceeding.

docket-clearing workhorse for the federal courts . . . .”). Commentators have taken their cue
from the Supreme Court, leaving the Rooker-Feldman doctrine largely overlooked in the
scholarly literature. This was the case, at least, until the Notre Dame Law Review’s 1999
publication of a thoughtful symposium on the doctrine. See Symposium, The Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081 (1999).
23. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
24. Id. at 414.
25. Id. at 415.
26. Id. (“[T]he suit is so plainly not within the District Court’s jurisdiction as defined by
Congress that the motion to affirm must be sustained.”).
27. Id.
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The Court then emphasized that lower federal courts are not the
“appropriate appellate proceeding” in which to correct state court
28
errors. No federal court other than the Supreme Court had been
given authority by Congress to reverse or modify state court
judgments, the Court held; to do so would be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, and “[t]he jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is
29
strictly original.”
Rooker’s holding, that federal district courts are not the correct
place for parties to appeal issues decided against them in state court,
30
is a narrow and uncontroversial principle. After Rooker, lower
federal courts applied this principle with regularity, usually to bar
31
actions with facts closely analogous to those of Rooker itself. The
32
Supreme Court cited Rooker only once, in passing, in the sixty years
between the Rooker decision and its companion case, District of
33
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.
B. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman
Feldman34 brought suit in federal court against the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals35 after that court denied his request for a

28. Id. at 415–16.
29. Id. at 416.
30. Bandes, supra note 22, at 1177.
31. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lecon Props., Inc., 457 F.2d 929, 930 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(district court had no jurisdiction over § 1983 action alleging violation of constitutional rights by
the state supreme court); Ash v. N. Ill. Gas Co., 362 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1966) (district court
could not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court eminent domain proceedings);
Williams v. Tooke, 108 F.2d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1940) (district court had no jurisdiction to reverse
or modify the state court judgment); Daniel B. Frazier Co. v. Long Beach Twp., 77 F.2d 764, 765
(3d Cir. 1935) (per curiam) (district court did not have jurisdiction over issues decided adversely
to plaintiff by highest court of the state); Reese v. Louisville Trust Co., 58 F.2d 638, 638 (6th Cir.
1932) (per curiam) (district court did not have jurisdiction to set aside state court judgment even
though federal constitutional questions were involved); Fryberger v. Parker, 28 F.2d 493, 496–97
(8th Cir. 1928), vacated per stipulation of the parties, 31 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir. 1928) (district court
had no jurisdiction over suit to enjoin enforcement of a state court judgment on due process
grounds). For a more thorough synopsis of the application of the Rooker principle by lower
courts in the interim between Rooker and Feldman, see Gary Thompson, Note, The RookerFeldman Doctrine and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts, 42 RUTGERS L.
REV. 859, 863–71 (1990).
32. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 283 (1946) (citing
Rooker in reference to the finality of prior judgments).
33. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
34. Although not technically consolidated, Feldman’s case was reviewed simultaneously
with a similar suit brought by plaintiff Hickey because the allegations and requested relief in
both were “virtually identical.” Id. at 472–73.
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waiver of its bar admission rule requiring all applicants to have
graduated from a law school accredited by the American Bar
36
Association. Taking an alternative path to his legal career, as
provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, Feldman had studied
with a practicing attorney, audited classes, and served as a law clerk
instead of attending law school.37 After passing the state bar exam, he
was admitted to the Virginia Bar and later to the Maryland Bar, after
Maryland waived its requirement that all applicants must be
graduates of an ABA-approved law school.38
After the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied
Feldman’s petition for waiver, he brought an action against the court,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.39 Feldman’s complaint
alleged both that the court’s action in denying his petition violated
due process and equal protection, and that the bar admission rule
itself violated due process and equal protection.40 The federal district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,41
but the circuit court reversed this decision on appeal. Although the
circuit court agreed that district courts do not have the authority to
review “determinations by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in judicial proceedings,” the court held that a denial of a request for
waiver of a bar rule was not a judicial proceeding; therefore, the
district court properly had jurisdiction.42
After determining the denial of waiver to be a judicial
proceeding, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that district courts lack
jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases
arising out of judicial proceedings, even if those challenges allege that
43
the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Such review may only
44
be had in the Supreme Court. Thus, to the extent that Feldman
35. As the highest court for the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals is treated as a state supreme court.
36. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 467–68.
37. Id. at 465.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 468–69.
40. Id. at 469 n.3. In addition to these Fifth Amendment claims, Feldman also alleged that
the defendants violated the Sherman Act, but the federal Court of Appeals dismissed the
antitrust claims as insubstantial, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari as to those claims. Id.
at 474 n.11.
41. Id. at 470.
42. Id. at 474.
43. Id. at 486.
44. Id. at 482.
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sought review of the denial of his petition for waiver, the district court
45
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. However, the Court distinguished
review of the state court’s application of the rule to a particular
proceeding from review of the rule itself. Because state supreme
courts act in a nonjudicial capacity in promulgating rules regulating
the bar, challenges to the constitutionality of the rules themselves do
not require a federal district court to review a state court judgment in
a judicial proceeding.46 Therefore, to the extent that Feldman
mounted a general challenge to the constitutionality of the rule, the
47
district court had jurisdiction.
In denying the district court jurisdiction over Feldman’s
challenge to the judgment of the state court, the Court held:
If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district
court are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial in a
judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff’s application for
admission to the state bar, then the district court is in essence being
called upon to review the state-court decision. This the district court
48
may not do.

Unlike the Rookers, Feldman did not ask the federal district court to
declare a state judgment null and void; in fact, he did not raise his
constitutional challenges in the state court at all (aside from arguing
49
that the rule was invalid). Nevertheless, finding that these claims
were “inextricably intertwined” with the District of Columbia court’s
ultimate decision to deny the waiver, the Court held that entertaining
the constitutional challenges would require the district court to
review a final judicial decision of a state court in a particular case,
which was beyond the district court’s jurisdiction.50
The inclusion of inextricably intertwined claims marked an
expansion of the Rooker principle, and to understand the meaning of
the phrase, it is important to examine more closely the context in
which it arose. After determining Feldman’s federal suit to be an

45. Id.
46. Id. at 485–86.
47. Id. at 486–87. The Court noted that in deciding that the district court had jurisdiction
over the elements of the complaints that involved a general challenge to the constitutionality of
the rule, it “expressly [did] not reach the question of whether the doctrine of res judicata
forecloses litigation on these elements of the complaints.” Id. at 487–88.
48. Id. at 483–84 n.16.
49. Id. at 480.
50. Id. at 486–87.
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impermissible appeal from the highest state court to a federal district
court, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated that the correct
court in which to bring such an appeal was the United States Supreme
51
Court. Then, in a footnote, he observed the possibility that even that
Court might lack jurisdiction over this action, due to Feldman’s
failure to raise his constitutional claims in the state court.52 However,
the fact that the Supreme Court might not have jurisdiction over the
action did not indicate that a district court should exercise jurisdiction
over the claims.53 Brennan seized the opportunity to correct this
flawed reasoning, which was being used by the Fifth Circuit at the
54
time. In a case with facts similar to those of Feldman, the Fifth
Circuit had pointed out that, because the plaintiff did not raise her
constitutional claims in the state court, the Supreme Court would not
be able to review her constitutional claims.55 The circuit court
reasoned that, in such a situation, a federal district court was not
entertaining an impermissible appeal if it exercised jurisdiction over
the case, both because it would not be infringing on the Supreme
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over state appeals and because the
specific federal constitutional claims had not been raised in the state
court proceeding.56
Decrying this reasoning, the Court reaffirmed that “lower federal
courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court
57
decisions.” If the constitutional claims presented in the district court,
although not raised in the state court, are inextricably intertwined
with the state court’s decision, then the district court is “in essence
being called upon to review” the state court judgment, which it may
58
in no way do. Feldman’s constitutional claims alleging that the
District of Columbia court, by denying his petition for waiver,
violated due process and equal protection were so inextricably

51. Id. at 482.
52. Id. at 483 n.16. In Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969), the Court held that “[i]t
was very early established that the Court will not decide federal constitutional issues raised here
for the first time on review of state court decisions,” id. at 438.
53. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16.
54. The particular case the Court sought to correct was Dasher v. Supreme Court of Texas,
658 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1981).
55. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296
(1970)).
58. Id. at 483–84 n.16.
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intertwined with the court’s decision to deny the waiver that his
claimed injury essentially was the court’s decision itself. Feldman was
in essence asking the district court to review the District of Columbia
59
court’s judgment. By failing to raise his constitutional claims in state
court, such a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review of the
state court decision in any federal court, a result that the Court found
60
“eminently defensible on policy grounds.”
Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined” language thus broadened
the reach of the Rooker principle to those plaintiffs who knew better
than to ask that the district court declare the state judgment null and
void, but who in essence sought just such relief under cloak of
constitutional claims. As will be seen, however, Feldman has been
used by the lower courts at times to greatly circumscribe the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, beyond Feldman’s unique
61
circumstances. After Feldman, district courts were left wondering
how to apply its new standards—how to differentiate between general
and particular challenges, and especially, how to identify when a
claim is inextricably intertwined with a challenge to a state court
judgment.62 With so little exposition on the phrase63—the Court
introduced it in a footnote without definition and only mentioned it
one more time, to conclude that it applied to Feldman’s claims—the
lower courts have been left to their own devices and have come to
significantly different conclusions about this pivotal element of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.64
C. Supreme Court Development of the Doctrine since Feldman
After Feldman, the Court did not comment on the RookerFeldman doctrine at any length65 until it decided Exxon Mobil Corp.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 486–87.
Id. at 484 n.16.
See infra Parts I.D, II.B, and III.
See Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, From the Ground Up, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129, 1136 (1999) (asserting that these distinctions have proven
“impossibly difficult to understand, as is apparent from the widespread confusion in the lower
courts”); Sherry, supra note 18, at 1108 (suggesting courts have had difficulty sorting out these
differences).
63. See Bandes, supra note 22, at 1183 (“Unfortunately, nothing in Feldman explains the
rationale for the [inextricably intertwined] language or gives any indication of its proper
scope.”).
64. See infra Part III.
65. The Court cited the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in only six cases between Feldman and
Exxon Mobil. See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002)
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66
v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. in March 2005. Although the Court
did not find that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied to any suits it
considered during this time, three cases in which the Court mentions
Rooker-Feldman may be helpful for interpreting “inextricably
intertwined” in its larger doctrinal context. In ASARCO Inc. v.
Kadish,67 the United States, as intervener, suggested that the
petitioners should sue in federal trial court to readjudicate the same
issues that were determined in the state court proceeding instead of
appealing to the Supreme Court, because their standing for the state
68
suit did not meet federal standing requirements. The Court rejected
this suggestion, saying that such a federal suit would in essence be an
attempt to obtain direct review of the state supreme court’s decision
in the district court, which would represent a “partial inroad on
Rooker-Feldman’s construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1257.”69
70
A few years earlier, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., a majority of
the Court agreed that Texaco’s challenge to Texas procedures for
enforcing judgments did not implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Pennzoil had prevailed in the state court with an unprecedented jury

(holding that Rooker-Feldman does not apply when a party seeks federal review of a state
agency action); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994) (holding that RookerFeldman does not bar the United States from bringing a federal action when it was not a party
to and does not directly attack the state proceedings); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.16
(1990) (citing Rooker and Feldman for the proposition that a district court “cannot entertain an
original action alleging that a state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an
unconstitutional state statute”); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622–23 (1989) (noting
that if petitioners sued in federal district court instead of appealing to the Supreme Court, the
federal action would be a “partial inroad on Rooker-Feldman’s construction of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257”); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rooker
and Feldman for the proposition that it would be anomalous to allow courts to review
judgments entered by courts of equal or greater authority); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481
U.S. 1, 6–10 (1987) (abstaining under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), instead of
dismissing under Rooker-Feldman); id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring) (maintaining that the “socalled Rooker-Feldman doctrine” does not apply to Texaco’s challenge to Texas procedures for
enforcing judgments); id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (asserting that RookerFeldman does not apply because Texaco did not file its federal action to challenge the merits of
the Texas suit); id. at 25–26 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (maintaining that RookerFeldman should apply because Texaco’s claims necessarily call for review of its state appeal).
66. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
67. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
68. Id. at 622.
69. Id. at 622–23.
70. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
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71
verdict, and Texas rules stipulated that unless the judgment debtor
posted bond (which would have been around thirteen million dollars),
the judgment creditor could place liens on the debtor’s property while
72
the case was appealed. Texaco brought suit in federal court seeking
a stay of judgment pending appeal, and the Court declined to dismiss
the case under Rooker-Feldman,73 holding instead that the district
74
court should abstain according to Younger v. Harris. The majority
opinion’s assumption of jurisdiction clearly demonstrated that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply; however, a majority of the
Justices wrote separately to explicitly affirm why the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine did not bar this suit.75
These Justices emphasized that in resolving Texaco’s challenge
to the Texas rules, the Court did not need to decide any issue “either
actually litigated in the Texas courts or inextricably intertwined with
76
issues so litigated.” Justice Brennan, the author of the Feldman
opinion, explained that Texaco filed the federal action only “to
protect its federal constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity for
appellate review,” not to challenge the merits of the underlying state
suit.77 Texaco’s federal action was therefore “separable from and
collateral to” the merits of the state court judgment.78
Justice Marshall, however, did not agree with the rest of the
Court concerning Rooker-Feldman’s applicability.79 In his
concurrence, he presented the following definition of “inextricably
80
intertwined,” which many lower courts subsequently adopted:

[I]t is apparent, as a first step, that the federal claim is inextricably
intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal claim
succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the

71. See Smith, supra note 17, at 627 (“This unprecedented damage award [$12 billion],
Texaco claims, is over forty times larger than the largest private civil judgment ever upheld in
any prior case of any kind.”).
72. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 4–5.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny stand for the proposition that
federal courts may not enjoin pending state court proceedings in certain circumstances.
75. These Justices were Scalia, joined by O’Connor; Brennan, joined by Marshall;
Blackmun; and Stevens, joined by Marshall.
76. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
78. Id. (quoting Nat’l Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977)).
79. Id. at 23 (Marshall, J., concurring).
80. See infra Part III.B.
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issues before it. Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a
conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive
the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a
81
prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.

Marshall opined that Texaco’s request for an injunction necessarily
involved some review of the merits of its state appeal, so it followed
from his definition that Texaco’s constitutional claims were
inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state judgment and
82
that the district court lacked jurisdiction.
One final case during this time period shed some light on the
83
meaning of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Johnson v. De Grandy
the Court held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar a Voting Rights Act
suit by the United States, despite a prior decision by a state supreme
court, because the United States was not a party to the state suit and
did not directly attack the state court judgment in the federal action.84
More illuminating than this, however, is the Court’s description of
Rooker-Feldman as the doctrine “under which a party losing in state
court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based
on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the
loser’s federal rights.”85 By indicating that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine might apply only to suits brought by state court losers for
whom the state court judgment itself is the alleged injury, De Grandy
suggested that the Court ascribed to a narrow view of the doctrine.
But not until Exxon Mobil would the Court explicitly clarify its
perspective on the boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
D. Critiques of the Doctrine
The majority of commentators on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
sharply criticize it, and many have suggested that it be abandoned

81. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 25 (Marshall, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 26.
83. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
84. Id. at 1006. The Court had already determined that the state proceeding should be
given no res judicata effect, id. at 1005, so it is unclear which of these three alternative rationales
was the driving force behind the Court’s decision. A number of lower courts did not interpret
the Court’s brief conclusory statements in De Grandy to be binding precedent that would
prevent application of Rooker-Feldman to nonparties. Sherry, supra note 18, at 1112 n.108.
85. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1005–06.
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86
entirely. The critics assert that to the extent that the current
conception of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine overlaps with existing
doctrines of preclusion and abstention, it is redundant and
87
unnecessary, and to the extent that it reaches beyond the preclusion
and abstention doctrines, it is harmful and even illegitimate.88 Some
commentators, on the other hand, acknowledge that Rooker-Feldman
plays a necessary, albeit narrow, role that neither existing preclusion
nor abstention doctrines fill.89 For example, imagine that a plaintiff

86. See, e.g., Jack Beermann, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let State Law Be Our
Guide, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1209, 1233 (1999) (suggesting that “the doctrine should be
abandoned altogether”); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 62, at 1174 (“Feldman should be
overruled, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is going to have to be renamed or abandoned.”);
Smith, supra, note 17, at 630 (“[O]ne may reasonably reach the conclusion that the Court in
both Rooker and Feldman was simply wrong . . . .”); Thompson, supra note 31, at 862 (calling
for an end to recognition of Rooker-Feldman as an independent doctrine of federal court
jurisdiction).
87. See MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS,
AND QUESTIONS 577–79 (4th ed. 1998) (noting that courts and commentators alike are in
disarray as to what, if anything, Rooker-Feldman adds to the other doctrines: “If RookerFeldman and res judicata are largely co-extensive, does Rooker-Feldman merely elevate res
judicata from an affirmative defense to a jurisdictional bar, making it less subject to the vagaries
of litigation and the arguments of the parties?”); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 62, at 1138–
67 (demonstrating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not “do any work” independent of
that accomplished by existing preclusion and abstention doctrines in federal suits involving
nonparties to the state suit, state criminal defendants, state civil defendants, state administrative
defendants, or involuntary state plaintiffs).
88. Susan Bandes argues that Rooker-Feldman is neither harmless nor interchangeable
with doctrines of preclusion or abstention. Instead, she asserts, Rooker-Feldman is inflexible
and does not contain the exceptions that soften these other doctrines. Bandes, supra note 22, at
1177–78. As a jurisdictional doctrine, Rooker-Feldman may trump important nonjurisdictional
policies. Even more troubling, lower courts seem to use the doctrine’s jurisdictional status to
avoid balancing the doctrine against countervailing doctrines or articulating the rationales
behind their dispositions. Id. at 1176–78. Professor Beermann, likewise, sees Rooker-Feldman as
an illegitimate expansion of preclusion rules. Beermann, supra note 86, at 1212. According to
the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), federal courts are to give prior state
judgments the same preclusive effect as the state court would—no more and no less. Marrese v.
Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). Beermann believes that RookerFeldman allows federal courts to give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than
the state would in some instances “because the characterization of the federal claim as an
appeal is a matter of federal, not state, law.” Beermann, supra note 86, at 1212. Finally,
Professors Friedman and Gaylord point out that as far as Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine that fills
the gaps left by traditional preclusion and abstention doctrines, it is troublesome because the
exceptions left by existing doctrines “tend to be there for a reason.” Friedman & Gaylord, supra
note 62, at 1130.
89. See Sherry, supra note 18, at 1089–90 (emphasizing that there are undesirable gaps in
preclusion and abstention doctrines which Rooker-Feldman is necessary to fill); Adam McLain,
Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1555,

06__JONES.DOC

656

12/19/2006 5:11 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:643

brings a federal suit, not seeking to enjoin state proceedings, but
seeking what is essentially review of a state judgment while state
90
appeals are still pending. Younger abstention does not apply, and in
some states interlocutory or appealable orders have no preclusive
91
effect. Rooker-Feldman would be necessary to prevent the
inappropriate federal appeal of the state court judgment. An even
better example is the situation in which a losing state court defendant
brings a federal suit seeking to rectify harms done by the state suit
itself. Such a challenge raises claims that do not arise from the same
transaction as the original state suit; indeed, these claims could not
have been raised in the state proceedings because the injury did not
occur until the announcement of the unfavorable state judgment.92
These new claims would not be barred by res judicata, but federalism
certainly counsels that federal courts should not entertain these
challenges to state court decisionmaking; the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is necessary to protect state courts in these instances.93
The few scholars who find some value in the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine perhaps have been vindicated by the Exxon Mobil decision,
in which the Court demonstrated that it still perceived a niche for
94
Rooker-Feldman not covered by any other existing doctrine. Despite
the apparent academic consensus that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
95
might be “worth only the powder to blow it up,” the Court in 2005
reaffirmed that it is here to stay, a holding that counsels lower courts
and scholars to attempt to learn how to apply the doctrine and its
central “inextricably intertwined” language correctly.

1557 (2001) (concluding that the scholarly criticisms of Rooker-Feldman are misguided and that
the doctrine, properly applied, avoids the problems currently associated with it).
90. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
91. See Sherry, supra note 18, at 1092 & n.35 (taking note of states in which interlocutory
orders have no preclusive effect).
92. Id. at 1093 (raising this hypothetical).
93. Federal courts may protect their judgments from state court interference by enjoining
state suits under the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
But state courts have no analogous power to protect themselves and their judgments from
federal court interference. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be understood to promote comity
as a functional equivalent of the relitigation exception. For further analysis, see McLain, supra
note 89, at 1582–84.
94. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (“RookerFeldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the
circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to
state-court actions.”).
95. Rowe, supra note 6, at 1081.
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II. THE COURT’S RECENT CLARIFICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.
In March 2005, the Supreme Court took the opportunity in
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.96 to rein in the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.97 The parties were engaged in a dispute
over royalties charged to a joint venture they had formed years
98
earlier. Saudi Basic sued ExxonMobil in Delaware Superior Court,
and approximately two weeks later ExxonMobil countersued Saudi
99
Basic in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The
state suit went to trial, with the jury returning a verdict in favor of
ExxonMobil, and Saudi Basic appealed to the Delaware Supreme
100
Court.
Before trial, Saudi Basic had moved to dismiss the federal suit,
alleging immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
101
1976. The district court denied the motion and Saudi Basic took an
interlocutory appeal; the Court of Appeals heard arguments in
102
December 2003, over eight months after the state court jury verdict.
The Court of Appeals raised the Rooker-Feldman doctrine sua sponte
and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction, hypothesizing that if
Saudi Basic won on appeal in Delaware, ExxonMobil would be
attempting in the federal action to “invalidate” the state court
judgment, “the very situation contemplated by Rooker-Feldman’s
‘inextricably intertwined’ bar.”103
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that federal
104
jurisdiction was proper. America’s dual system of courts allows for

96. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
97. See id. at 283 (noting that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been variously interpreted
by the lower courts, sometimes “to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman
cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction
exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to
28 U. S. C. § 1738”).
98. Id. at 289.
99. Id. When ExxonMobil later answered Saudi Basic’s state court complaint, it asserted as
counterclaims the same claims it made in the federal district court. Id.
100. Id.
101. Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1611 (2000).
102. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 290. At ExxonMobil’s request, the Court of Appeals had
stayed its consideration of the appeal awaiting resolution of the state trial court proceedings. Id.
103. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2004).
104. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 294.
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parallel state and federal litigation, and Rooker-Feldman does not
support the notion “that properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction
vanishes” if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related
105
question while the federal suit remains under consideration. In
parallel litigation, a federal court may be bound by state preclusion
law, but preclusion is not a jurisdictional bar.106 The Court held that
even if a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously
litigated in state court, if the federal plaintiff presents some
independent claim, “albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a
state court has reached in a case to which he was a party,” then the
federal court has jurisdiction and “state law determines whether the
defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.”107 The Court
significantly narrowed the general understanding of the RookerFeldman doctrine:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of
the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or
supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines
that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference
108
to state-court actions.

This restatement of the doctrine provides lower courts with
significant clarifications for employing Rooker-Feldman.
B. What Exxon Mobil Clarified
Primary to Exxon Mobil’s definition of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is the stipulation that it only be used against state court
losers.109 In this way the Court spelled out for the conflicting circuit
110
courts that the doctrine does not apply to nonparties to the state

105. Id. at 292.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)).
108. Id. at 284.
109. Id.
110. Compare Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050, 1051 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming, on other
grounds and without comment to the Rooker-Feldman issue, an unpublished lower court
decision using Rooker-Feldman to bar a nonparty to the state action from bringing a federal
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suit. Likewise, the Court made it clear to the divided circuits that the
alleged federal injury must be caused by the state court judgment
111
itself and that Rooker-Feldman is not implicated simply because a
party brings to federal court a matter it previously litigated in state
112
court. Exxon Mobil demonstrated to the uncertain lower courts that
the doctrine does not bar parallel litigation,113 and the Court’s
exposition elucidated the mysterious relationship between Rooker114
Feldman and the preclusion doctrines.
C. What Exxon Mobil Did Not Clarify: “Inextricably Intertwined”
Despite these helpful clarifications, the one issue the Court did
not explicate in Exxon Mobil was what it means to be inextricably
intertwined for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Indeed, the
Court only mentioned the phrase when it described the Feldman
115
116
case and the erroneous decision of the Court of Appeals below.
The Court’s affirmation of Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined”

suit), with United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply RookerFeldman to a nonparty because there is no obligation to intervene to protect one’s rights).
111. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. Compare Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin.,
95 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that Rooker-Feldman bars plaintiff’s federal challenges
to his employer’s termination procedures), with Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 497 (8th Cir.
1995) (concluding that the plaintiffs avoid Rooker-Feldman by challenging the action of an
adverse party rather than the state court’s approval of that action).
112. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. Compare Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 196
(4th Cir. 2002) (“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts may not consider . . .
‘issues actually presented to and decided by a state court’” (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d
728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997))), with ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int’l Corp., 366 F.3d 205, 210–11 (3d Cir.
2004) (“The ‘actually litigated’ test . . . is potentially misleading in this case because of its close
relationship to the concepts of claim and issue preclusion.”).
113. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292–93. Compare Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 418 (6th Cir.
2005), vacated in part, 413 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
divested the district court of jurisdiction upon the entrance of a judgment by the state court in
parallel litigation), with Vulcan Chem. Techs., Inc. v. Barker, 297 F.3d 332, 338 n.2 (4th Cir.
2002) (“It would be a novel application of the already beleaguered Rooker-Feldman doctrine to
divest a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction simply because a parallel case was later filed
in State court seeking to decide the same question.”).
114. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (explaining that preclusion is not a jurisdictional
matter and is distinct from and subsequent to the Rooker-Feldman inquiry). Compare Vargas v.
City of N.Y., 377 F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine is generally
applied coextensively with principles of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel
(issue preclusion).”), with Parkview Assocs. P’ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir.
2000) (asserting that Rooker-Feldman is not simply a jurisdictional version of preclusion).
115. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 286.
116. Id. at 291.
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117
holding would seem to indicate continued support for the principle,
but the Court itself did not use the “inextricably intertwined” concept
in its analysis of the Exxon Mobil case at all.118 Such avoidance of
what could be considered the main element of the Rooker-Feldman
119
doctrine not only fails to clarify the meaning of the phrase but also
further confuses the issue by calling into question the concept’s
120
continued use.

III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO “INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED”
Without much guidance from the Supreme Court121 concerning
the meaning and application of the abstruse “inextricably
122
intertwined” concept, federal courts have formulated their own
criteria and rules, resulting in a rather large body of diverse
standards. These various formulas can be reduced to at least four
basic approaches, each with some amount of internal diversity and
almost none with a consistent circuit-wide application. For simplicity
in examination and critique, this Note characterizes these as the res
judicata approach, the Marshall approach, the GASH approach, and
the Noel approach.

117. Id. at 286 & n.1.
118. See id. at 291–94 (analyzing Rooker-Feldman’s application to the case).
119. See Rowe, supra note 6, at 1081–82 (defining the “main point” of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine thusly: “that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that are
‘inextricably intertwined’ with the merits of a judgment already rendered by a state court
system”).
120. For analysis of what the Court’s treatment of “inextricably intertwined” in Exxon
Mobil may mean for the future of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see infra Part V.
121. See Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“Since Feldman, the Supreme Court has provided us with little guidance in determining which
claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a prior state court judgment and which are not.”).
122. See Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“‘[I]nextricably intertwined’ is a somewhat metaphysical concept . . . .”).
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A. The Res Judicata Approach
The res judicata123 approach equates “inextricably intertwined”
with the traditional “could have been raised” standard of
124
preclusion. Under this approach, a challenge in federal court is
inextricably intertwined with a previous state court judgment if the
federal plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to raise the claim in
the state proceeding, whether the plaintiff actually raised the claim or
not;125 accordingly, a “claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman
126
doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion.”
Courts that use this approach rely on Feldman and its rejection of
Dasher v. Supreme Court of Texas127 for the proposition that a
plaintiff who fails to raise a challenge in the state court may forfeit
128
federal review of that challenge.

123. Also known as claim preclusion, res judicata is used here in its narrow sense, referring
to “the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation of a matter that never has been litigated,
because of a determination that it should have been advanced in an earlier suit.” Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). Courts that use this approach
end up with a Rooker-Feldman doctrine that encompasses both claim and issue preclusion,
however, because they interpret Rooker-Feldman’s general prohibition of appeals as a bar on
raising issues that have already been litigated (issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel) and its
“inextricably intertwined” language as barring claims that have not been litigated but should
have been (claim preclusion, or res judicata). See, e.g., Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1075 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining how “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
mirrors claim and issue preclusion”).
124. See Goetzman v. Agribank, FCB (In re Goetzman), 91 F.3d 1173, 1178 n.6 (8th Cir.
1996) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine, like the doctrine of preclusion, applies to claims which
were not brought before the state court but could have been raised in the state court action.”).
125. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e view the res
judicata requirement of full and fair opportunity to litigate, and the Feldman ‘inextricably
intertwined’ barrier to federal jurisdiction as two sides of the same coin.”); Wood v. Orange
County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e hold that the Rooker bar can apply only to
issues that the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise.”).
126. Moccio, 95 F.3d at 199–200.
127. Dasher v. Supreme Court of Tex., 658 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1981). The Court in Feldman
rejected Dasher’s holding that a district court had jurisdiction over direct challenges to a state
court judgment simply because the particular cause of action that the federal plaintiff brought
(§ 1983) was not raised in the state proceeding. The Dasher court reasoned that because the
Supreme Court could not review the § 1983 action because it had not been raised in the state
court, district court jurisdiction was not an impermissible appeal in violation of Rooker’s
interpretation of § 1257. In rejecting this argument, the Court introduced the phrase
“inextricably intertwined.” D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983).
128. See, e.g., Barefoot v. City of Wilmington, 306 F.3d 113, 120 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing
Feldman’s footnote 16 for the proposition that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars issues that
could have been raised in the state court proceeding”); Wood, 715 F.2d at 1546 (citing
Feldman’s footnote 16 for the proposition that “the Rooker bar also operates where the plaintiff
fails to raise his federal claims in state court”).
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But construing this language as an expansion of the RookerFeldman doctrine is a misinterpretation of the Court’s discussion in
Feldman. The Court began by commenting that, according to
129
Cardinale v. Louisiana, it may not have jurisdiction to review a state
court decision if a petitioner failed to raise his constitutional claims in
the state court. After rejecting Dasher’s suggestion that this meant
that a district court could therefore hear such an appeal even if it
directly challenged a state court judgment, the Court concluded that
if a party failed to raise his constitutional challenges in the previous
state court proceedings, he “may forfeit his right to obtain review of
the state-court decision in any federal court.”130 Courts that subscribe
to the res judicata approach interpret this language to mean that
Rooker-Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined” bar prevents any
federal court from having jurisdiction over any claim that could have
been raised in the state court proceedings.131 But the Feldman Court
132
was simply referring to the limits on its own certiorari jurisdiction.
The fact that a constitutional claim was not raised in the state court
precludes Supreme Court jurisdiction over the state court judgment,
but it does not prevent the plaintiff from bringing the constitutional
challenge in a federal district court, unless that challenge is
inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment itself so that
the district court is in essence being asked to exercise appellate
review of the state court decision.133
Furthermore, the res judicata approach contradicts Feldman’s
134
holding that a general challenge to the constitutionality of a rule is
not inextricably intertwined with the state court’s application of that
135
rule to a particular plaintiff. In holding that the district court had

129. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969).
130. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16.
131. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
132. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16 (discussing in the context of “the requirement that
constitutional claims be raised in state court as a predicate to our certiorari jurisdiction”).
133. See id. at 483–84 n.16 (“If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district
court are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s [decision], then the district court is in
essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.”). For a different take on the
interplay between “could have been raised” and “inextricably intertwined” in Feldman that
reaches the same conclusion, see Smith, supra note 17, at 646–47.
134. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487 (holding that the general attack on the constitutionality of
the rule was not barred by Rooker-Feldman).
135. See Parkview Assocs. P’ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Such
a reading [that Rooker-Feldman precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over all claims that
could have been raised in a previous state court proceeding] would be inconsistent with the
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jurisdiction over the general attacks, the Court expressly did not
reach “the question of whether the doctrine of res judicata
136
foreclose[d] litigation” of those claims, an explicit indication that
the Court differentiated between res judicata and “inextricably
137
intertwined.” Certainly the general attacks in Feldman could have
been raised in the state court, but this did not prevent the Court from
138
allowing the district court to exercise jurisdiction over those claims.
Confusing res judicata with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s
“inextricably intertwined” element is understandable insofar as both
doctrines “define the respect one court owes to an earlier
139
judgment.” But the two are founded on different principles: res
140
judicata rests on the Full Faith and Credit Statute, which requires
federal courts to give a judgment the same effect as the rendering
state would,141 whereas the Rooker-Feldman doctrine rests on the
142
principle that district courts only have original jurisdiction. RookerFeldman is a jurisdictional bar, whereas res judicata determines which
party prevails after the court has assumed jurisdiction over the suit.143

Court’s other holding in Feldman that the district court did have jurisdiction over the general
challenge to the constitutionality of the rule.”).
136. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487–88.
137. See Parkview Assocs. P’Ship, 225 F.3d at 329 (“In Feldman, the Supreme Court sub
silentio acknowledged the difference between the doctrines when, after directing remand of the
plaintiffs’ general constitutional challenges, it expressly refrained from considering res judicata,
leaving that question to the district court.”).
138. See Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that if a constitutional
claim is inextricably intertwined merely because it could have been raised in the earlier state
proceeding, “the Court would not have allowed the litigants in Feldman to bring their general
constitutional challenges to the bar admission rule in federal district court”). The Court’s
treatment of Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1987), indicating that RookerFeldman did not bar a district court from exercising jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge
that could have been brought in the state court proceedings, further buttresses this conclusion.
See Ritter, 992 F.2d at 754.
139. GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993). Indeed, ever
since Rooker was decided, courts have conflated its jurisdictional principle with preclusion. See
Thompson, supra note 31, at 866 & n.27 (citing cases in which Rooker was used as a principle of
res judicata, not a doctrine of federal jurisdiction).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
141. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985).
142. See supra Part II.
143. See GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 728 (emphasizing that the jurisdictional question
precedes the determination of whether the defendant prevails under preclusion principles);
Sherry, supra note 18, at 1101–02 (“Rooker-Feldman . . . tell[s] federal courts when they may
review state court decisions; preclusion rules tell them how to treat those decisions. The former
issue sounds purely in federalism, while the latter can arise in any context, including between
states.”).
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Conflating “inextricably intertwined” with preclusion elevates res
144
judicata from an affirmative defense to a jurisdictional bar and
results in an entirely redundant Rooker-Feldman doctrine that has no
145
independent meaning of its own. Moreover, because preclusion is
governed by state law, such an approach allows state law to determine
the contours of federal jurisdiction and govern a doctrine based
146
entirely on federal law.
This interpretation of “inextricably
intertwined” is a blunt instrument and reaches far beyond the
circumstances of the Rooker and Feldman cases, often denying
plaintiffs their choice of forum,147 or worse, denying them a chance to
bring their action (which does not seek to overturn the state court
judgment) at all. Taken to its logical end, this approach makes the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine superfluous and abrogates our dual system
of courts.
B. The Marshall Approach
The Marshall approach generally finds a claim to be inextricably
intertwined with a previous state court judgment if, for the plaintiff to
prevail, the district court must make a determination that indicates
that the state court was wrong about some matter.148 This approach is

144. By essentially giving res judicata jurisdictional status, this approach prevents courts
from considering the nuances of preclusion and of the case at hand, which litigation might bring
to the fore. See REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 87, at 578 (suggesting that if res judicata
becomes a jurisdictional bar it is less subject to “the vagaries of litigation and the arguments of
the parties”).
145. This interpretation is the source of many of the problems critics find with the RookerFeldman doctrine. See, e.g., Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 62, at 1129 (criticizing RookerFeldman to the extent that it does not seem to add anything not already supplied by preclusion
doctrine); Thompson, supra note 31, at 911 (concluding that any possible difference between
Rooker-Feldman and preclusion is purely academic).
146. See Vargas v. City of N.Y., 377 F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (using New York’s
preclusion rules to determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction over the federal
plaintiff’s claim); Randolph v. Lipscher, 641 F. Supp. 767, 775 (D.N.J. 1986) (using New Jersey
res judicata law to determine if Rooker-Feldman bars the plaintiff’s federal constitutional
claim); cf. Kenman Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 479 (10th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing
between res judicata, which is based largely on state common law, and Rooker-Feldman, which
is concerned with federalism and based squarely on federal law).
147. See Bandes, supra note 22, at 1176 (discussing the significant amount of forum shifting
created by such a broad understanding of Rooker-Feldman).
148. See Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that a federal claim is
inextricably intertwined if “federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state
court was wrong” (quoting Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir.
2003))); ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int’l Corp., 366 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2004) (“If the relief
requested in the federal action requires determining that the state court’s decision is wrong or
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reflected in Justice Marshall’s Pennzoil concurrence: “[I]t is apparent,
as a first step, that the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with
the state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the
149
extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.”
With so little clear guidance from the Supreme Court concerning
“inextricably intertwined,” many lower courts have embraced this
150
lucid definition from Justice Marshall.
This approach, however, can lead courts to some absurd
151
conclusions. For example, in Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp.,
the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ malpractice claims152
against their former attorney were inextricably intertwined with the
state court’s approval of a settlement between the attorney and an
adverse party and were therefore barred.153 In the state court
proceedings, the plaintiffs were out-of-state members of a class that
154
brought a suit against the bank. The state court approved a
proposed settlement between the class and the bank, including
attorney’s fees.155 But because the attorney sought his fees out of each
individual’s refund from the settlement rather than directly from the
bank’s funds, some class members, including the Kamilewiczs,
suffered a net loss despite the settlement.156 When the plaintiffs

would void the state court’s ruling, then the issues are inextricably intertwined . . . .” (quoting
FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996))); SafetyKleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 858 (4th Cir. 2001) (“A federal claim is ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with a state court decision if ‘success on the federal claim depends upon a
determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’” (quoting Plyler v.
Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997))); Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d
1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in
order to find in favor of the plaintiff, the issues presented to both courts are inextricably
intertwined.”); Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) (“A claim is
inextricably intertwined if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court
wrongly decided the issues before it.”).
149. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring).
150. See Sherry, supra note 18, at 1097 (calling Marshall’s definition the “most useful—and
most frequently quoted”).
151. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
152. The plaintiffs brought numerous claims, including those against their former attorney,
against the Bank (the opposing party in the underlying state litigation), and against the Bank’s
lawyers. Id. at 509. The claims that are pertinent here are the claims against their attorney for
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.
153. Id. at 511.
154. Id. at 508.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 508–09. To be specific, Kamilewicz recovered $2.19 in the settlement and was
charged $91.33 in attorney’s fees. Id. at 508.
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brought a malpractice suit against the attorney, the court held that the
157
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred jurisdiction.
The circuit court, concerned that allowing the plaintiffs to seek
recompense from the class attorney would force the district court to
“run directly into the state court finding . . . that the fees were
reasonable,” concluded that the suit was inextricably intertwined with
158
the state court judgment. If the plaintiffs prevailed against their
former attorney in federal court, that outcome would indicate that the
state court was wrong in finding that the settlement, including
attorney’s fees, was fair and reasonable. According to the Marshall
approach, then, the malpractice suit was inextricably intertwined with
the state court decision.
But clearly the plaintiffs were not, in their malpractice suit,
seeking to overturn the state court judgment. Their suit could in no
way be styled as an appeal of the state court decision; therefore, it did
not implicate the rationale behind the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The
entitlements of the adverse state court parties vis-à-vis each other
were fixed by the judgment, and the plaintiffs did not seek to change
159
those. Instead, they asserted that they suffered independent harms
due to their attorney’s breach of loyalty and care, which were
160
concealed both from the class and from the state judge. But because
a holding for the plaintiffs in federal court would depend on finding
that the state court was wrong about the reasonableness of the
attorney’s fees, the suit was barred.161
The Kamilewicz holding suggests that the Marshall approach is
too broad a definition of “inextricably intertwined,” a suggestion that
is confirmed by Pennzoil. Justice Marshall was the only Justice who
was of the opinion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Texaco’s
162
federal suit—five Justices explicitly rejected the application of
157. Id. at 510.
158. Id. at 511.
159. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
160. Id. at 1352.
161. Judge Easterbrook’s approach is more harmonious with the rationales behinds the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 1353 (“Were [plaintiff] merely claiming that the decision of
the state court was incorrect, even that it denied him some constitutional right, the doctrine
would indeed bar his claim. But if he claims, as he does, that people involved in the decision
violated some independent right of his . . . then he can, without being blocked by the RookerFeldman doctrine, sue to vindicate that right.” (quoting Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1004
(7th Cir. 1995))).
162. Justices Scalia, O’Connor, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens.
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163
Rooker-Feldman and the remaining three did so sub silentio by
joining the majority opinion, which assumed jurisdiction was
proper.164 Marshall appears to have been correct in asserting that the
federal court had to conduct some inquiry into the merits of the state
appeal in order to make the requisite determinations of irreparable
injury and likelihood of success of the merits.165 But unlike Marshall,
166
the other Justices, most notably Justice Brennan, did not find that
this made the federal claims inextricably intertwined with the state
court judgment. Brennan, the author of Feldman, opined that because
Texaco did not file its federal suit to challenge the merits of the state
court decision, its pursuit of a stay of judgment pending appeal was
“‘separable from and collateral to’ the merits of the state court
judgment.”167 Marshall’s broad approach would have prevented
Texaco, on Rooker-Feldman grounds, from being able to bring a
challenge in federal court that was not seeking an appeal of or even
implicated by the merits of the state court judgment.
Inconsistent with Pennzoil itself, the Marshall approach can be
used to bar actions that, although possibly requiring inquiry into state
court issues, do not seek to upset a state court judgment. The
Marshall approach to “inextricably intertwined” seems to have at its
core a healthy interest in protecting state court judgments and
promoting comity; however, it covers too broad a spectrum of claims,
resulting in undesirable outcomes such as Kamilewicz. The
overbreadth of this approach prevents these and other worthy
plaintiffs from bringing their independent challenges in federal court.

C. The GASH Approach
A third approach to “inextricably intertwined” currently in use
168
among lower federal courts is the GASH approach, which focuses
on the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff.169 According to this

163. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and White.
164. See Thompson, supra note 31, at 888–89 (dissecting the Rooker-Feldman opinions in
Pennzoil).
165. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 26 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment).
166. Id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
167. Id. (quoting Nat’l Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977)).
168. The approach is so labeled here because one of the most frequently cited articulations
of this approach is in GASH Associates v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1993).
169. See Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In order to determine the
applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the fundamental and appropriate question to ask
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approach, the “inextricably intertwined” determination “hinges on
whether the federal claim alleges that the injury was caused by the
state court judgment, or, alternatively, whether the federal claim
alleges an independent prior injury that the state court failed to
170
remedy.” If the federal claim alleges an injury that was caused by
the state court judgment, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
jurisdiction over that inextricably intertwined claim, whether it was
argued in the state court or not.171 When a plaintiff suffers an injury
out of court and then fails to get relief from the state court, a
subsequent federal suit is not inextricably intertwined; only if the
plaintiff complains of an injury which was caused by the state court
judgment would Rooker-Feldman prohibit federal jurisdiction.172
Under this approach, if a plaintiff is not seeking to set aside the state
court judgment but rather presents “some independent claim, albeit
one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a
case to which he was a party,” then the federal court has
jurisdiction.173
This approach interprets the rationale behind the RookerFeldman doctrine primarily to be the prevention of collateral attacks
174
on state court judgments. The Rooker and Feldman cases are about
the inappropriateness of district courts entertaining state court
appeals, so this approach declines to extend the “inextricably
intertwined” inquiry beyond asking if the “district court is in essence
175
being called upon to review the state-court decision.” This method
is also in accord with the Supreme Court’s indications of its postFeldman (and therefore after the addition of “inextricably

is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself
or is distinct from that judgment.”).
170. Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004).
171. See Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that Rooker-Feldman’s bar against federal jurisdiction when a plaintiff alleges an injury caused
by a state court judgment reaches to inextricably intertwined claims even if those claims were
not argued in the state court).
172. See GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 729 (holding GASH’s claim barred because its injury
came from the state court judgment—it did not “suffer an injury out of court and then fail to get
relief from state court”).
173. Id. at 728.
174. See id. at 727 (“Litigants cannot file collateral attacks on civil judgments; instead they
must seek review in the Supreme Court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine creates a jurisdictional
obstacle to collateral review, one we must respect even if the parties do not present the issue for
decision.”).
175. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983).
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intertwined”) understanding of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as
176
continuing to be a doctrine about appellate review.
The GASH approach to “inextricably intertwined” is consistent
with the Rooker-Feldman result in Pennzoil as well. In that case,
Texaco’s federal suit did not allege that the state court judgment was
Texaco’s injury but rather that something other than the court’s
177
judgment, namely the Texas statute, caused its injury. If the
Kamilewicz court had taken this approach, Kamilewicz would have
been allowed to bring his malpractice suit, because the injury he
alleged was not caused by the state court judgment but rather by the
class attorney.178 However, in both of these cases, although the
plaintiffs did not seek to undermine the state court judgment, aside
from that adverse judgment they would not have had independent
federal claims to bring—that is, the adverse state court judgment gave
179
them standing to bring their independent challenges. The causation
requirement, therefore, cannot be a simple but-for connection;180 it

176. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994) (“[U]nder this Court’s
Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine, . . . a party losing in state court is barred from seeking
what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district
court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal
rights.”); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622–23 (1989) (noting that a federal suit
attempting to “obtain direct review of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision . . . would
represent a partial inroad” on Rooker-Feldman).
177. Texaco challenged the constitutionality of the Texas lien and bond requirements.
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 6 n.6 (1987).
178. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 100 F.3d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing) (The malpractice suit was “a suit against a nonparty (the
lawyer) alleging harm from incompetent or deceitful acts. That the lawyer’s misconduct
occurred in a judicial proceeding doesn’t insulate the lawyer from liability, even when the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine insulates the judgment”).
179. See McLain, supra note 89, at 1576 (“[I]n both cases, the injury alleged in federal court
would not have occurred but for the state court judgment, but in neither case did the plaintiff
seek to undermine that judgment in any way. The injury in both cases was proximately caused
by someone or something other than the state court . . . .”).
180. But see Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1515–16 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(using a but-for causation analysis to bar federal jurisdiction of the plaintiff’s general challenge
to the constitutionality of a bar rule). The Richardson court doubted that without the adverse
state court judgment Richardson would have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
bar rule. Id. According to this “but-for” analysis, the state court judgment is the cause of his
general complaint, and therefore his general attack is inextricably intertwined with the state
court judgment. Id. But this result is not consistent with Feldman. Although the court tried to
distinguish Feldman by pointing out that Feldman could again attempt to apply for the bar, so
he might still have standing to challenge the rule aside from the state court judgment denying
him a waiver, id., this argument is unconvincing. If the D.C. court in Feldman had come to the
opposite conclusion, granting his waiver, then he would not have had standing to challenge the
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instead asks whether the state court judgment both actually and
proximately caused the injury for which the federal plaintiff seeks
181
redress. As in Pennzoil, if the plaintiff would not have standing to
pursue his federal challenge aside from the adverse state court
judgment, this fact alone does not make his federal claim inextricably
intertwined with the state court judgment.182 Only if the state court
judgment is both the actual and proximate cause of his alleged injury
is the plaintiff’s federal claim barred.
Although there are some internal variations among courts that
183
use the GASH approach, they agree that the rationale behind the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine only supports a definition of “inextricably
intertwined” that hinges on whether the federal claim alleges an
injury caused by the state court judgment.184 This approach is
significantly narrower than the previous two, more common,
approaches, and for that reason it may be more appealing to critics of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.185

rule. And this is precisely the case with Richardson—if the state court had decided not to
suspend him, he would not have standing to challenge the suspension rules.
181. Kenman Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 476 (10th Cir. 2002).
182. In the GASH opinion itself, Judge Easterbrook supports a previous Seventh Circuit
decision finding that if the adverse state court judgment was the only reason the plaintiff had
standing to bring the independent challenge then the independent claim was inextricably
intertwined and was outside federal jurisdiction. See GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995
F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993) (supporting Leaf v. Supreme Court of Wis., 979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.
1992)). For a demonstration of why this approach is inconsistent with Feldman, see supra note
180.
183. In addition to differing opinions regarding the federal plaintiff’s standing, some courts
that subscribe to the GASH approach disagree on whether they should add a “full and fair
opportunity to litigate” requirement to the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry. Compare, e.g.,
Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Once we have
determined that a claim is inextricably intertwined, i.e., that it indirectly seeks to set aside a
state court judgment, we must then determine whether ‘the plaintiff did not have a reasonable
opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings.’” (quoting Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d
660, 668 (7th Cir. 2002))), with Kenman Eng’g, 314 F.3d at 478–79 (rejecting the full and fair
opportunity to litigate inquiry because “[i]njecting the full-and-fair-opportunity-to-litigate
inquiry into the Rooker-Feldman [sic] analysis tends to blur the distinction between res judicata
and Rooker-Feldman”).
184. See Cory v. Fahlstrom, 143 Fed. App’x 84, 87 (10th Cir. 2005) (“This is a claim that [the
plaintiff] was injured by the state court judgment, which is precisely the type of claim prohibited
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”).
185. For example, Jack Beermann has argued that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should
have no application “when the complaint in federal court is about conduct outside of the state
court, because it is inaccurate to characterize such a claim as an appeal from the state court’s
judgment. It may be an attempt to relitigate, but it is not an appeal.” Beermann, supra note 86,
at 1214.
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D. The Noel Approach
The most recently developed approach to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine’s “inextricably intertwined” language is that articulated by
the Ninth Circuit in Noel v. Hall.186 The Noel approach has two steps:
First, the court determines if the federal plaintiff is seeking to bring a
187
“forbidden de facto appeal” of the state court judgment. Then, and
only then, the court considers if the plaintiff is seeking to litigate an
issue that is inextricably intertwined with the state court judicial
decision from which the forbidden appeal is brought.188 “Only when
there is already a forbidden de facto appeal in federal court does the
‘inextricably intertwined’ test come into play.”189 The Noel court
emphasized that a federal suit “is not a forbidden de facto appeal
190
because it is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with something.” That is,
federal suits should not be dismissed based on Feldman’s
“inextricably intertwined” standard alone—if the court does not first
determine that the suit seeks an impermissible appeal of the state
court judgment, none of the issues the suit raises can be considered
inextricably intertwined.191
The majority of the Noel court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis thus
focuses on whether the plaintiff seeks a forbidden de facto appeal,
which the court finds to occur “when the plaintiff in federal district
court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state
192
court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” In
193
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc. the Ninth Circuit found that, although the
plaintiff sought relief from the state court judgment, she did not
194
complain of a legal wrong committed by the state court. Instead, she
alleged that wrongful acts of the defendants were responsible for the
court’s erroneous judgment.195 Because her complaint only satisfied
one prong of the “forbidden de facto appeal” test, the court held that
186. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003).
187. Id. at 1158.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir.
2005) (“Under Noel, claims are dismissed as ‘inextricably intertwined’ only when an improper
appeal under Rooker-Feldman is already before the district court.”).
192. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163.
193. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004).
194. Id. at 1139.
195. Id.
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Kougasian was not seeking a forbidden appeal and therefore it had
no occasion to inquire into whether any of her claims were
196
inextricably intertwined with issues before the state court. Although
in “an ordinary language sense, the issues in Kougasian’s claims
[were] indeed ‘inextricably intertwined’ with issues in [the state court
proceedings],”197 the court held that “[b]ecause she is not bringing a
forbidden de facto appeal, there are no issues with which the issues in
her federal claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ within the meaning of
Rooker-Feldman.”198
This approach shifts “inextricably intertwined” to the back
burner of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine based on a close reading of
the Feldman case, in which the phrase was introduced. In Feldman,
the Court first determined that the plaintiffs were seeking
impermissible appellate review of the state court decision; it then held
that those Fifth Amendment claims that were inextricably intertwined
with the impermissible appeal were also barred, but those Fifth
Amendment claims that related to the general challenge (which was
not an impermissible appeal) were not inextricably intertwined with
an impermissible appeal and therefore not barred.199 The “inextricably
intertwined” limitation only served to prevent Feldman “from raising,
in the non-appeal part of his suit, issues that he was prevented from
litigating in his forbidden de facto appeal.”200 The Noel court’s
reluctance to dismiss actions for being inextricably intertwined was
heightened by the Supreme Court’s caution in employing the
doctrine.201 Furthermore, the court found preserving the possibility for
simultaneous litigation and not overstepping the bounds of preclusion
to be important reasons for hedging in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
in this way.202

196. Id. at 1143.
197. Id. at 1142.
198. Id. at 1143; see also Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that
“inextricably intertwined” does not come into play because the federal plaintiff is not alleging a
legal wrong of an erroneous state court decision).
199. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing the Feldman court’s
use of “inextricably intertwined”).
200. Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142.
201. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158–59 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court has not used the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to deny jurisdiction in any case other than those two).
202. See id. at 1159 (encouraging caution “in light of two well-established rules that would
be in tension with an overly broad reading of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . first, the rule
that overlapping or even identical federal and state court litigation may proceed simultaneously,
limited only by doctrines of abstention and comity; and, second, the rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
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Perhaps because of its relative youth, the Noel approach has not
been substantively critiqued by courts that employ other approaches,
but the Ninth Circuit itself has compared its method to those of other
circuits. The court has correctly observed that the res judicata
approach is much broader than this approach, effectively barring any
claim that is inextricably intertwined, in the ordinary language
203
204
sense, with issues already decided in the state court. Similarly, the
Marshall approach is also more expansive than the Noel approach.205
The court has noted that the GASH approach presents a “similar
206
formulation” of the injury requirement, although the Noel approach
seems to be more restrictive in its use of the “inextricably
intertwined” concept.
The Noel approach seriously constrains not only the
“inextricably intertwined” inquiry but also the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine as a whole. To the extent that this approach cuts away much
of the overlap with and intrusion upon the doctrines of preclusion and
abstention, those who criticize the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for not
“doing any work”207 may be attracted to this approach. However, the
emphasis this approach places on the relief the federal plaintiff seeks
and the formal structure of the approach’s stages may make it
possible for plaintiffs to pass the requirements and get into federal

under which a federal court must give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment” as
the courts of that state would give to that judgment).
203. The court distinguishes between the “ordinary language sense” of inextricably
intertwined and its “narrow and specialized meaning in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”
Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142.
204. See id. at 1142–43 (distinguishing the Noel approach from one that equates
“inextricably intertwined” with principles of preclusion).
205. For example, imagine a federal plaintiff who brings a due process challenge to the
revocation of a medical license without challenging the state court judgment that affirmed the
license revocation on the merits. According to the Marshall approach, see supra Part III.B, if the
federal plaintiff succeeded in the due process challenge, it would indicate that the state court
was wrong about the appropriateness of the revocation; therefore, the challenge is inextricably
intertwined with the state court judgment and must be dismissed. But according to the Noel
approach, the federal plaintiff does not both complain of a legal wrong allegedly committed by
the state court and seek relief from the judgment of that court; therefore, the plaintiff advances
no forbidden appeal with which the claim could be inextricably intertwined, and the federal
court has jurisdiction. See Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142 (distinguishing the Noel approach from a
case in which a due process challenge to revocation of a medical license was dismissed as
“inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment affirming revocation of the license on the
merits” (citing Wang v. N.H. Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 703 (1st Cir. 1995)).
206. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164.
207. See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 62, at 1132 (finding that Rooker-Feldman does
little work independent of preclusion and abstention doctrines).
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court yet run afoul of the spirit and purpose of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. It remains to be seen if the Noel approach may be too
narrow to properly respect and protect state courts.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF EXXON MOBIL FOR
“INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED”
Having surveyed the approaches the circuit courts have taken
toward the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s “inextricably intertwined”
language, what guidance can be gleaned from the Supreme Court’s
Exxon Mobil decision? Recall that in Exxon Mobil the Court
restricted Rooker-Feldman to the narrow ground208 of the Rooker and
Feldman cases, both of which involved federal plaintiffs calling upon
209
district courts to “overturn an injurious state-court judgment.” The
unanimous Court specified four requirements for invocation of the
doctrine: 1) the case must be brought by a state court loser; 2) the
injury alleged must be caused by the state court judgment; 3) the
judgment must have been rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced; and 4) the case must invite district court
review and rejection of that judgment.210
Finding that Exxon Mobil did not satisfy all four aspects of this
exposition and therefore escaped application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, the Court did not have occasion to consider whether
211
ExxonMobil’s claims were inextricably intertwined. The Court did
mention “inextricably intertwined” in its account of the RookerFeldman doctrine212 and did not repudiate the concept, indicating that
it is still a part of the doctrine. But by not using the concept in its
analysis of the case, the Court seemed to show that a determination
as to whether a claim is inextricably intertwined or not is not essential
to every Rooker-Feldman inquiry. It could be that by leaving
“inextricably intertwined” out of its distilled definition of the Rooker-

208. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (“In the
case before us, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit misperceived the narrow ground
occupied by Rooker-Feldman.”).
209. Id. at 292.
210. Id. at 284; see also Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir.
2005) (dividing Exxon Mobil’s four requirements into two substantive components and two
procedural components).
211. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293–94 (finding that ExxonMobil filed the federal action
before judgment was rendered in the state court and that ExxonMobil was the winner in the
state court proceedings).
212. Id. at 286 n.1.
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Feldman doctrine and not using it in its analysis in Exxon Mobil the
Court was indicating that the concept has no independent meaning
213
and instead simply states a conclusion. However, it is also possible
that, because this case dealt primarily with and was resolved on the
issues of timing and parallel litigation, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
was never triggered,214 and thus, there was no need to inquire into the
215
substance and possible intertwinement of ExxonMobil’s claims.
So what does Exxon Mobil mean for the four approaches to
“inextricably intertwined” examined in this Note? It is clear that the
res judicata approach is no longer a viable option. The Court
explicitly differentiated between preclusion, which is not a
216
and Rooker-Feldman, which “does not
jurisdictional matter,
otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine,”217 even citing a
Second Circuit case that equated res judicata with “inextricably
intertwined” as an example of an interpretation that extends the
doctrine “far beyond” its proper contours.218 Courts that had been
using a res judicata approach have already begun to notice that their
219
understanding of the doctrine must be “substantially altered,”
recognizing that after Exxon Mobil their inquiry can no longer be
whether an issue was or could have been litigated in the state court,220
but rather should be whether the federal plaintiff alleges an injury
221
due to the state court judgment itself. To make this point crystal
213. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87 (“[T]he phrase ‘inextricably intertwined’ has no
independent content. It is simply a descriptive label attached to claims that meet the
requirements outlined in Exxon Mobil.”).
214. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292 (“When there is parallel state and federal litigation,
Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the entry of judgment in state court.”).
215. Indeed, the Court never looked into or even listed what claims ExxonMobil brought in
the federal court, except to say they were the same as its state court counterclaims. See id. at 289
(ExxonMobil answered Saudi Basic’s state court complaint by asserting counterclaims that were
the same as those claims it made in the federal suit).
216. See id. at 293 (“Preclusion, of course, is not a jurisdictional matter.”).
217. Id. at 284.
218. See id. at 283 (citing Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199–200
(2d Cir. 1996), as an example of an overbroad interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
219. Federacion de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d
17, 19 (1st Cir. 2005).
220. See Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279–80 (4th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing
between res judicata and Rooker-Feldman and citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292, for the
proposition that the question for Rooker-Feldman purposes is not simply whether an issue has
been litigated in state court).
221. See Mercury v. S. Liberty Realty Corp. (In re Mercury), 153 Fed. App’x 756, 757 (2d
Cir. 2005) (noting that after Exxon Mobil, Rooker-Feldman applies only “if the federal suit is
brought to remedy an injury whose source is the state-court judgment itself”).
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clear, the Court issued a per curiam opinion less than a year after
Exxon Mobil, explicitly stating that “Rooker-Feldman is not simply
222
preclusion by another name.”
Although some courts are still using Marshall-esque language
alongside the Exxon Mobil formulation of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine,223 the Marshall approach to “inextricably intertwined” does
not appear to survive Exxon Mobil any better than the res judicata
approach. The Court, quoting GASH, held that, as long as a plaintiff
presents some independent claim, “albeit one that denies a legal
conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a
party,” the federal court has jurisdiction.224 Contrary to the Marshall
approach, the Exxon Mobil Court would allow a federal court to
entertain a suit in which success for the plaintiff would deny a legal
conclusion reached by the state court. Exxon Mobil’s requirement of
225
“review and rejection” of a state court judgment further indicates
that the Marshall approach to “inextricably intertwined”
inappropriately bars independent challenges from federal court.226

222. Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 1202 (2006) (per curiam). In this case, the plaintiffs
were not parties to the underlying state-court proceeding, but the district court determined that
they were in privity with the state-court plaintiff according to preclusion law and thus their
federal suit should be barred by Rooker-Feldman. The Court admonished the district court for
“erroneously conflat[ing] preclusion law with Rooker-Feldman. . . . The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because,
for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the
judgment.” Id. In so holding, the Court agreed with the doctrine’s critics that “[i]ncorporation of
preclusion principles into Rooker-Feldman risks turning that limited doctrine into a uniform
federal rule governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith
and Credit Act.” Id. at 1202–03. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
223. See Johnson v. Ohio Sup. Ct., 156 Fed. App’x 779, 782 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Marshall’s definition from Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
concurring), alongside the footnote in Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 286 n.1, on inextricably
intertwined); Indus. Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc. v. Monroe County, 134 Fed. App’x 314, 317 (11th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil’s definition of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Exxon Mobil,
544 U.S. at 292, alongside a circuit case saying federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits in which
“‘the relief requested . . . requires determining that the state court’s decision is wrong’” (quoting
Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003))); Chajkowski v.
Bosick, 132 Fed. App’x 978, 979 (3d Cir. 2005) (defining a federal claim as “inextricably
intertwined” if it “succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues
before it” (quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d
Cir., 1996))).
224. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d
726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)).
225. Id. at 284, 291.
226. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Welch, No. 1:05-cv-0467-DFH-TAB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15451, at *8 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2005) (“The language of ‘review and rejection’ in Exxon Mobil
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Perhaps, then, the Exxon Mobil decision affirms the Noel
approach: because the Court did not find ExxonMobil to be seeking
an impermissible appeal of a state court judgment, it did not move on
to the second step to consider whether any of ExxonMobil’s claims
might be inextricably intertwined with the judgment from which
appeal was sought. Perhaps, like the Noel court, the Exxon Mobil
Court was focusing on the relief sought, as opposed to the issues
raised, by the federal plaintiff.227 The Noel approach is certainly still
viable, even strengthened, after Exxon Mobil;228 but although the
Court did not inquire into the issues ExxonMobil raised, it did not
focus on the relief ExxonMobil sought either. One comes away from
Exxon Mobil with the sense that it is a procedural, rather than
substantive, decision—in applying Rooker-Feldman to the facts of the
case, the Court focused almost entirely on the fact of the parallel
litigation.229 So, although the bases of the Noel approach are
confirmed by the Exxon Mobil decision, it is a stretch to say that the
230
Court embraced its detailed approach. The lower court in Exxon
shows that a mere reading of a state court decision to determine its contents will not be
sufficient to trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284)).
227. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 133.30[3][c][iii] (predicting one possible
interpretation of “inextricably intertwined” after Exxon Mobil to be that “it is relevant only if at
least one claim in a federal suit asserts an injury caused by a prior state-court judgment and
seeks review and rejection of that judgment,” an interpretation they found “consistent with that
adopted by the Ninth Circuit” in Noel).
228. See Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1029–30 & n.9
(9th Cir. 2005) (noting that in Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court affirmed the substance of
Noel’s formulation of Rooker-Feldman as violated when a plaintiff seeks relief from a state
court judgment by asserting as his injury a legal wrong in the judgment itself).
229. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293–94 (discussing the relation between Rooker-Feldman
and parallel litigation, and deciding the case based on the fact that “Rooker-Feldman did not
prevent the District Court from exercising jurisdiction when ExxonMobil filed the federal
action, and it did not emerge to vanquish jurisdiction after ExxonMobil prevailed in the
Delaware courts”); see also Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2005) (observing
that determining whether state court proceedings were complete is the first step of a post-Exxon
Mobil Rooker-Feldman analysis).
230. But see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined”
Explicable at Last? Rooker-Feldman Analysis After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision,
2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 13 (May 2006), http://fclr.org/2006fedctslrev1.htm (last visited Oct. 22,
2006) (advancing the Noel approach and finding it “consistent with Exxon Mobil”). This article,
published in the interim between the creation and publication of this Note, suggests that
although Exxon Mobil does not endorse or logically mandate the Noel approach, it is
“consistent with the Exxon Mobil Court’s reading of Feldman and its overall analytical
approach.” Id. at 16. Rowe and Baskauskas confirm the conclusions of this Note, however,
when they assert that “the ‘inextricably intertwined’ formulation, although not expressly
repudiated or limited, appears to have been relegated to—at most—some secondary role and in
any event no longer to be a general or threshold test.” Id. at 3–4.
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Mobil based its decision on the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry,
so if the Supreme Court sought to introduce the circuits to a
structured approach in which “inextricably intertwined” is only
considered after it is determined on the basis of another claim that
Rooker-Feldman applies, this was the case in which to do it. But
instead the Court only briefly mentioned “inextricably intertwined”
and its connection with the doctrine, giving no indication that it
envisioned a bifurcated approach to the concept.
The GASH approach, then, which is quite similar to but less
structured than Noel, may be most in line with the Court’s indications
in Exxon Mobil. The Exxon Mobil formulation of the RookerFeldman doctrine centers on the key requirement that the federal
232
plaintiff alleges an injury caused by the state court judgment, which
is the heart of the GASH approach to “inextricably intertwined.” In
addition, the Court quoted the analysis from GASH with approval in
its analysis and disposition of Exxon Mobil, noting that Noel was in
agreement with the quoted passage.233
CONCLUSION
Looking ahead to future invocations of Rooker-Feldman’s
“inextricably intertwined” concept, lower courts would be well
advised to follow the lead of the GASH court and its progeny. In
Exxon Mobil the Court dramatically narrowed the common
understanding of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a whole, an
indication that it envisions a more narrow use of “inextricably
intertwined.” An approach that employs “inextricably intertwined”
not as an alternative bar to jurisdiction independent from the central
Rooker-Feldman analysis, but rather as a partner with such analysis
and subject to the Exxon Mobil requirements, will not run afoul of

231. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291.
232. See id. at 284, 291–92 (confining Rooker-Feldman to cases in which the state court
judgment caused the alleged injury, as in the Rooker and Feldman cases); see also Mercury v. S.
Liberty Realty Corp. (In re Mercury), 153 Fed. App’x 756, 757 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that
after Exxon Mobil, “Rooker-Feldman applies only if the federal suit is brought to remedy an
injury whose source is the state-court judgment itself”); Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of
Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005) (The key to Rooker-Feldman lies in Exxon Mobil’s
“second substantive requirement: that federal plaintiffs are not subject to the Rooker-Feldman
bar unless they complain of an injury caused by a state judgment. Indeed, this is the core
requirement from which the others derive; focusing on it helps clarify when the doctrine
applies”).
233. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293.
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the Court’s pronouncements on the doctrine thus far. However,
courts should now be careful not to go to the opposite extreme of
creating too narrow a role for “inextricably intertwined” in their
analysis, thereby obliterating Feldman’s expansion of the doctrine.
Although Exxon Mobil cut away at much of Rooker-Feldman’s
ground cover, it left the doctrine’s federalist roots intact.

